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. \ 
O~F IC~ OF RICHARD NIXON 
I 
t 
t 
\ 
June 9, 1977 
Dear Senator Eastland: 
President Nixon recently wrote 
an article on Presidential powers 
for the Washington Star. 
Although you might have read it 
there, he asked me to send you the 
enclosed copy in light of your 
special interest and expertise regarding 
such important issues. 
Cordially, 
" 
Ken Khachigian 
The Honorable James Eastland 
united States Senate 
Washington, D. C. 20515 
Enclosure 
-, 
... 
F'" 
For publication June 5, 1977, 
For: ,The Washington Star 
/ 
Because of widespread misinterpretations 
of the comments I made on the inherent powe~s 
of the Presidency; in one of my recent television 
, . 
interviews, I feel I ought to set the record 
, 
straight by stating in my own way what I 
J 
- bel~~~~ those powers . are. · I would hope that ~he 
debate over my views could center on what thos,e 
views are, not on the way they have been 
represented by columnists and cartoonists 
on the basis of fragments of one conversation. 
Others will have differing views, but the issue 
is a serious one which I hope can be seriously 
debated. 
First, I do not believe and would not 
, 
argue that a President is "above the law". Of 
course he is not. The question is ' what is the 
law and how is it to be applied with respect to 
1 
, 
I 
I 
2 
the President in fulfilling the duties of his 
office. Precedents over the years have 
sanctioned some degree of ' latitude in the use 
by Presidents of emergency measures to meet 
emergency situations. I believe such latitude 
is necessary, and at times vital. 
" 
My insistence that this lati tude does .,' 
not place Presidents \Ia~ove the law" is not ',a 
semantic quibble. _To me, it is a ' vital distinction 
which goes to the heart 'of our constitutional 
system. 
The laws .serve as a constraint on 
Presidents, as they do on all other officials 
and all other citizens. When I " stated, . in .the 
Frost interview, that "when ,the President does 
it, that means that it is not illegal," I 
was speaking within a very limited context of " 
emergency actions, and I was referring to that 
traditional latitude provided in dealing with 
• emergencles. 
.. 
/ 
WE 
3 
,-
In speaking of "the lawn, I mean the 
f 
,I 
term to encompass the law in its entirety: 
the Constitution, the statutes, and that ov~rlay 
of in~erpretation and usage which maintains the 
. . -
; 
law as ·a living instrument. Every day, 'courts 
are required to interpret the written law in 
It : 
light of experience~. ,- Presidents have a comp~rable 
responsibility. 
, 
Sometimes the letter of one law conflicts 
with the spirit of another. In such cases, a 
. -President must choose which to follow. It 
was to this choice that Lincoln r~ferred when 
he argued in 1864: "By general ' la~ life and 
1 - b t b t t d t ft ll-·mb) t 1m mus e ,pro ec e, ye ' oena . mus 
~-, 
be amputated . to ' save a life, · but a life is never 
.~ -
wisely -given to save a limb. I felt that 
measures, otherwise unconstitutional, might 
become lawful by becoming indispensable to the 
preservation of the Constitution through the 
preservation of the nation. Right or wrong, I 
assumed that ground and now avow it." 
.. 
4 
The argument over how broadly the inher~nt 
powers of the Presidency should be construed 
is one !of the oldest in our nation's constitutional 
history. Jefferson relied on the inherent powers 
of the office in making the Louisiana Purchase. 
History ratified his claim, even though lawyers 
]t ' 
and scholars debated .it. Truman relied on 
inherent powers when he seized the steel industry 
, 
in 1952, in order to avert a crippling .wartime 
labor walk-out. The Supreme Court ruled that 
he had exceeded his powers. Yet even in that 
case, three members of the Court -- led by Chief . 
-
Justice Fred M. Vinson -- argued that he had 
seizure should be upheld. 
In his dissent, Vinson argued that the 
Presidency "was deliberately fashioned as an 
office of ' power and independence. Of course, 
the Framers created no autocrat capable of 
arrogating any power unto himself at any ti.me. 
• 
5 
But neither did they create an automaton I 
impotent to exercise the powers of Government 
, 
/at a time when the survival of the Republic ' 
itself may be at stake." 
It is in the middle ground between those 
J: 
extremes -- between the concepts ofautocrat ~· 
and automaton -- that the argument really 
, 
centers. It is not over whether a President 
has unlimited discretionary power or no ': 
discretionary power, but rather how much, what 
kind, and in what circumstances. This is 
necessarily a gray area, precisely because the 
powers we are debating are those needed to deal 
with unforeseen circumstances which often 
threaten uncertain consequences. Thus there is 
.... 
no way in which these powers can be codified 
satisfactorily, or exercised in a way which 
will not be subject to legitimate debate. 
My own perspective 'on these powers was 
different when I was in the White House than it.' 
was when I was in ·Congress -- just as many of 
my critics construed the ' powers more broadly 
when Franklin Roosevelt or Harry Truman was 
\. 
President, and more narrowly when I was President • 
My point here • not that the other • 1S one or Vlew 
> 
• right,' but rather that the debate often 1S 
turns less on what the powers are than on who 
I 
happens to be • • them. This • turn exerclslng In 
illustrates the subjective way in which the powers 
are viewed, and also the subjective way - in which 
t 
each President n~cessarily approa~hes their use. 
The Constitution requires the President 
to "take car~ that the laws be faithfully . 
executed." President Benjam.in Harrison once 
described this duty as "the central idea of the 
office. n . Each person .wi·ll have his own view o ·f 
what "faithful" execution of the laws means. 
7 
My own view -- supported by the practice of ' 
past Presidents -- is that it means executing / 
them in a manner faith£ul to the nation's vital 
, 
interests. It does not mean executing them 
mindlessly or 'mechanically. In emergency 
situations it ,means .doing so in a manner 
faithful to the spirit of our basic laws, and 
~ 
yet ,at the same time faithful ' to that basic .,' 
( 
trust which a people repose in their chief 
executive: trust that he will do what is 
necessary, in their interest and in their name, 
when their safety or the security of the nation 
• 
itself is threatened. 
Faithful execution sometimes requires 
finding appropriate ways to apply the laws to 
meet particular circumstances. We have a 'lways 
recognized, for example, that exceptions have 
to be made in wartime. In dealing with a major 
threat to the public safety, a President who 
let himself be paralyzed by the strict letter 
, 
8 
of the law would violate his oath: that would 
not be faithful execution, because his ultimate 
responsibility under ' law is to protect the 
nation and its citizens. 
Discretionary power in administering 
. 
or executing the laws is not unique to the 
... 
President. Prosecutors sometimes elect not to 
. , 
enforce a partlcular statute, when the 
surrounding circumstances persuade them that 
to do so would result in an injustice rather 
• 
than justice, or when it would compromise 
other national interests -- for example, by 
revealing intelligence sources. A lot of 
jurisdictions still have archaic laws on the 
/ 
, books, so bizarre that no one expects them to be 
enforced. 
'The point is that the law is not a 
precision instrument. Those who write the laws 
can never foresee all the circumstances in which 
those laws might be applied. Therefore, those 
9 
charged with executing them need some measure 
of lat~tude, some room for the exercise of 
judgment, for prudent response, for protecting 
the public interest --- for adapting the -
statutory laws to the laws of necessity and to 
/ 
. ,\ -
the - rule of reason. We have traditionally 
provided that latitude. 
I 
To maintain . that anything at all ""--
anything without limit -- which a President 
might order thereby became legal would be 
absurd, and I doubt that anyone would seriously 
assert such a claim. But it would be equally 
absurd to maintain that there is no area of 
discretion in which a President can take emergency 
~ ',., 
actions to meet emergency situations, and, by 
his sanction, protect subordinate officers 
against legal penalties. This range of discretion 
is not unlimited. It has to be bounded by the 
limits of common sense, of necessity, and of 
. 
fidelity to the basic concepts of our Constitution 
! 
-
10 
and of our body of statute law, as interpreted 
by the courts. These limits do not protect 
agains~ all abuse, but they do protect against 
" 
substantial abuse -- and no system, however 
circumscribed, can be perfect. 
,. -
The nature of power is that it will ~ 
sometimes be abused, even unwittingly -- by the 
I 
executive, by the legislature, and by the 
courts themselves. But the exercise of power 
is not necessarily the abuse of power, even 
when that exercise results in a technical breach 
of statutory limits : ~ It may be, and frequently 
is, an effort to, reconcile conflicts between 
law and necessity. As Thomas Jefferson wrote 
in 1810:, "A strict observance of the written 
law is doubtless one of the high duties of a 
good citizen, but it is not the highest. The 
laws of necessity, of self-preservation, of 
saving our country when in danger, are of a 
higher obl~gation ... to lose our 60untry by a 
scrupulous adherence to -the written law, would 
be to lose the law itself, with life, liberty, 
property and all those who are enjoying them 
-
- -'-~"'---'-'-- ~."'- "_. -- - -
'-
11 
\ 
with USi thus absurdly sacrificing the end to 
the means." 
The so-called Huston Plan -- which we 
never put into effect, though my approval of it 
'. 
was in effect for five days until I rescinded 
" " that · approval --was" quite specifically, .tar9.eted 
at an organized, clandestine campaign of violence 
in .which people . were bei'ng killed andcomrnuni ties I 
terrorized. Because it was organized and directed 
nationally, combatting it was a Federal 
• 
responsibili ty... . It was getting wo'r;se, and we 
had no idea how much worse it was going to get. 
The principal groups targeted were the Weathermen 
./ 
and the Black Panthers, both products of the fad 
in the late 1960s of preaching hate and 
romanticizing violence, even murder. Both groups 
openly preached murder and terrorism. In 1970, 
there were 50,000 bomb threats, and 3,000 actual 
bombings in- the United states. In the first half 
of 1970, there were almost as many guerrilla acts 
of sabotage and terrorism as there were in the 
entire twelve months of 1969. 
-
-12 
A decade ago, ' a high FBI offici~l reported 
I 
in a secret memo (since made public by the 
Senate Intelligence Committee) that the results 
of jus,t , one illegal surreptitious entry had been 
. . 
I 
• 
used to "bring about (the) near disintegration" 
of the Ku Klux Klan. Was lhat breach of the law 
, ~ . 
by the FBI right· or ~rong? Was the Klan's 
threat to individual, liberties sufficient -' to ' 
justify that intrusion on its members' liberties? 
The same question posed b,y the Klan's activities 
was posed by those of the Weathermen. When a 
• New York town house blew up in March, 1970, it 
turned out to have been a bomb factory operated 
by the Weathermen. , Did saving the lives 
threatened by the Weathermen's bombs justify 
. . , lntrudlng on the Weathermen's liberties? 
These are questions Presidents confront. 
In the real world, where the price of not acting 
may be paid in the lives of innocent citizens, 
the answers are not easy. 
13 
) 
, 
War abroad, organized violence and terror 
at horne -- these were the emergencies we faced ' 
in 1970. Future Presidents will face other 
emergencies. They may be less serious, or 
they ma~ be more so. The one thing certain 
about them is that their nature cannot be 
predicted with cer~ainty. All we can be sure 
• • ~;f' 
of is that .they wi~l occur. ' Because , we cannot 
forecast what form they will take, we cannot 
, 
prescribe in advance what measures will be 
needed to deal with them successfully. That is 
why we must ~eave this gray area of discretionary 
authority, ,this residue of inherent powers 
that are not spelled out because they cannot be. 
Any .system of government based on the 
ideal ofl freedom must, of n~~~ssi~y, be a 
structure of balances. We seek. to balance 
freedom and order; legislative, executive and 
judicial powers; federal, state and local 
responsibilities; the role of government and 
14 
the rights of the citizen. Any balance struck 
is going to be, to some extent, unsatisfactory. 
This is the nature of balancing. But unless 
we maintain a balance, we risk sacrificing 
either our liberty or our safety. 
, 
Presidentsa~e elected not merely to be 
automatons, . but to "exercise judgment. The 
decisions that reach a President's desk are, 
by definition, the close decisions. Those 
which admit of easy, black-and-white answers, 
• 
are decided at a lower level. 
It would be disastrous - if j in an excess 
of prohibitory zeal, we were to tie the President's 
hands now and in the future" limiting him merely 
\ 
to the mechanical function of executing the 
precise letter of the law written in other times 
and for other circumstances. We have to place 
15 
, 
some faith in his judgment. We have to give 
him room for maneuver. We have to weigh the 
potent~al for abuse if we do allow him to act 
agains~ the potential for disaster if we do not 
allow him to act. 
/ 
_\ 
A President has basic responsibilities, 
.. ~. 
rooted in the Constitution and refined through 
nearly two centuries of 'national experience, 
for the safety and well-being of the nation and 
its people. He • not autocrat. He does 1S an 
" 
not rule by fiat '. ~· ' His .powers are not unlimited. 
But neither can he be powerless to go beyond the 
strict letter- of-- existing law --- in a limited 
way, and at times of special need -- and still 
meet thepe larger responsibilities. The result 
is a situation somewhat anomalous by nature, 
one that allows .for no precise definition, but 
one 'in which the letter of the law and the light 
of experience must both be the sometimes 
conflicting guideposts by which he steers. 
, . 
16 , .1. 
This is quintessentially an area in which 
we must follow the ~ictates of common sense, 
recognizing that faithful execution of the laws 
is not always literal execution of the laws. 
Nearly two centuries of usage have sanctioned 
this range of discretion. It is a limited 
range, but a vital - one, and impossible to codify 
... 
because it does deal with the -unforeseen. - In 
an emergency, we must not have our chief 
executive so paralyzed by laws written for other 
circumstances that he cannot act in these 
circumstances. In each situation, there will 
be differing judgments about what necessity 
requires. But a President cannot escape the 
need to make those judgments. He can and should 
be held accountable for the wisdom with which 
\ 
he makes them. But to fail ' to make them -would 
be an abdication of his prime responsibility 
to insure the security of the nation and the 
safety of its people. 
J 
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